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I.  Introduction 
 
The cost of compensating victims of injuries caused by their hospital 
treatment has been a long-standing source of controversy for the NHS.  The 
resources required to recognise the legitimate right of such patients represent 
a clear opportunity cost to a budget-constrained health system.  Recently, this 
situation has become especially acute, with public spending cuts coinciding 
with apparent record levels of NHS expenditure on a growing number of 
compensation claims.1  The chair of the NHS Litigation Authority (hereafter 
NHSLA; the agency tasked with fighting and paying compensation claims) 
explicitly recognises this trade-off in the foreword to the Authority‟s 2010 
Annual Report: „A significant and growing proportion of NHS funds, which 
would otherwise be available for patient care, is being spent on litigation.‟  In 
principle, there are many ways to tackle such pressures, ranging from drastic 
reform of the basis for paying compensation (as proposed by the Chief 
Medical Officer in 2003: Department of Health, 2003a) to regulating the level 
of legal fees (as proposed by Jackson, 2009), yet an ongoing role is played by 
the NHSLA‟s policies to help contain hospitals‟ litigation costs.  In this paper, 
we investigate empirically a central element of this policy in order to 
determine its effectiveness.  We do this in the context of a particular patient 
safety problem, hospital acquired MRSA infections (itself a source of major 
public concern over the past ten years), and using a unique panel data set we 
have assembled for this purpose.2   
 The source of the above litigation costs is, of course, tort liability. In 
principle tort liability is itself a means of incentivising care in the NHS, as 
hospitals found to have caused injuries through negligent care levels are 
forced to compensate the patients in question.3   However hospitals in 
                                                 
1 See for example, “Massive rise in cost to NHS of settling compensation claims” (The 
Independent, 28 March, 2010).  This debate itself can be seen against the background of 
disquiet about a “compensation culture” in the UK, exemplified by the current Government‟s 
setting up of Lord Young‟s recent examination into this issue (see Young, 2010). 
2 The data were collected as part of ESRC grant RES-153-25-0027. 
3 See Danzon (2000) for a survey of theory and empirical results here, and Fenn et al. (2004) 
for a discussion in the context of the NHS. 
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England and Wales purchase insurance against the risk of such claims through 
membership of the NHS‟s Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST) – a 
liability risk pool where the NHSLA offers cover in return for contributions 
from members.4  Such membership may have two effects on NHS costs.  
First, hospitals‟ contributions may be perceived as excessive by hospital 
management if not closely linked to their underlying risk levels and this may 
lead to alternative arrangements being sought by lower risk hospitals, and 
higher contributions for the remainder.5  Second, care levels may be diluted by 
such insurance so that the volume of claims rises.6 In principle, the NHSLA 
could seek to overcome these problems by setting deductibles (so the hospital 
internalises a portion of any injury costs it causes), or by experience-rating 
hospital contributions to the Scheme (so that these contributions rise or fall 
along with claims history). Since 2001, the NHSLA has withdrawn the use of 
deductibles, and instead moved towards the use of a form of risk classification 
(where the NHSLA specifies a direct relationship between the hospital‟s 
contribution and verifiable procedures put in place by hospitals to minimise 
risk).  We describe this policy in more detail in Section II but, broadly, 
hospitals are assessed according to a number of pre-set criteria and classified 
into one of three standards as a result.  Each triggers a contribution discount, 
with higher standards yielding larger discounts.  Future performance is 
assessed on a regular basis and allows the hospital to apply to be assessed for 
higher levels over time. A key objective of the current paper is to assess 
whether hospitals that attain higher standards (as measured by the NHSLA‟s 
                                                 
4 The CNST is a non-funded, pay-as-you-go risk pool. Membership is not compulsory but in 
practice all NHS hospitals are members. 
5 The NHSLA‟s Framework Document (para. 2.3.viii) states that one of its key functions is to 
„determine contributions from members towards the costs of the contributory schemes‟. 
Clearly, the viability of the scheme would be put at risk if the contributions paid by low risk 
hospitals were perceived to be excessive. 
6 A formal objective is for the NHSLA “to contribute to the improvement of the quality of 
patient care by providing incentives within the schemes for NHS bodies to improve cost 
effective clinical and non clinical risk management” (NHSLA Framework Document, para. 
2.2.v). 
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criteria) are associated with improved levels of patient safety (as measured by 
MRSA infection rates).7 
 The presence of such an association may be a necessary condition for 
an effective risk management system but it does not indicate how the system 
achieves this.  In common with other insurance settings, two broad 
possibilities exist.  First, the policy of offering financial discounts for risk 
management standards is consistent with a motivation to reduce moral hazard 
through incentivising hospitals to invest in improved risk management 
processes (Bond and Crocker, 1991).  Second, it could alternatively be argued 
that the NHSLA is using the risk management standards as a way of 
classifying those hospitals into groups which, on actuarial grounds, would 
merit differing contributions due to differing expected claims costs (Crocker 
and Snow, 1986; 2000). These two alternative views of risk classification are 
difficult to distinguish empirically: any relationship found in cross-sectional 
data (conditional on observables) showing that hospitals with good safety 
outcomes are those with better risk management standards (and hence with 
lower contributions) would be consistent with either explanation.  However, 
as Chiappori (2000) observes, providing dynamic data are available on safety 
outcomes and premiums (or risk management discounts in our case), a 
distinction may be empirically testable and this is the approach we adopt.8  In 
particular, we test for exogeneity of the levels of risk management standards 
achieved by hospitals as this provides an indication of whether this 
achievement reflected prior care levels, or induced additional investment in 
care.9  To the extent that these levels are exogenous to the patient care 
provided, this suggests a causal relationship running from risk management 
standard to care and, in turn, this is consistent with incentives offered by the 
                                                 
7 Fenn et al. (2007) and Fenn et al. (2010) undertake a similar analysis of the NHSLA‟s 
previous use of deductibles.   
8 See also Abbring, Chiappori and Pinquet (2003) and Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman and 
Pinquet (2003). 
9  Chiappori (2000, p. 373) favours this approach in his discussion of empirical research in 
other insurance settings. 
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NHSLA (risk management discounts) helping to encourage patient care, ceteris 
paribus. 
 In order to examine the effects of these policies on hospital care, we 
need a proxy for care.  We use MRSA infection rates within NHS hospitals.10  
Hospital-acquired infections such as methicillin resistant staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA) have become an especially important policy concern in the 
NHS over the last twenty years. A dramatic increase in the proportion of S. 
aureus bacteraemia that were resistant to penicillin treatment occurred in the 
1990s, from 2% in 1990 to a peak of 43% in 2002 (Johnson et al. 2005). Some 
of these cases, particularly in very young and elderly patients, had severe 
consequences, with the Office for National Statistics reporting that MRSA 
was mentioned on 1,629 death certificates in England and Wales in 2005. 
Well-documented compensation payouts to a number of MRSA sufferers, 
additional treatment costs of approximately £1bn per year (National Audit 
Office, 2000) and reputation costs to the NHS itself have made hospital-
acquired infections a high profile and important focus for the patient safety 
debate in the NHS, and led to the introduction of a mandatory surveillance 
system in England in 2001 (Health Protection Agency, 2007).  Better 
surveillance, enhanced hospital cleaning measures, financial incentives and 
penalties, and education and publicity campaigns have since been 
accompanied by a substantial decrease in reported cases: a total of 2,935 cases 
of MRSA infections in England were reported to the Health Protection 
Agency in the year ending March 2009, down from a peak of 7,700 in 
2003/04.   
 This decrease has occurred in spite of a substantial increase in hospital 
activity in the form of increased inpatient admissions, particularly of elderly 
patients and those with health seriously compromised by underlying disease. 
The implication seems to be that the reduction in MRSA infections has been 
achieved in the face of increased patient exposure and must therefore be 
                                                 
10 MRSA rates may provide a suitable subject for such analysis because they are linked to 
hospital-wide activity as opposed to the particular treatment needs of an individual patient; as 
such they could be more amenable to „control‟ by management initiatives.  
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attributable to measures taken by NHS trusts to reduce risk, several of which 
have involved multi-million pound expenditure campaigns (as documented in 
Section II).  In fact, other trends over the period may also have affected the 
incidence of MRSA infections.11  Notwithstanding this point, a potential 
concern with many of the measures adopted to address MRSA infections is 
that they have tended to exhort rather than incentivise improved behaviour  
and, in the case of one-off expenditure drives, may not have a lasting impact – 
an especially acute problem given the limited prospects for repetition in the 
current public expenditure climate.  This means that more „ongoing‟ policies 
such as providing financial incentives to comply with the NHSLA‟s risk 
management standards may form an important component of longer term 
attempts to control MRSA infection rates. 
 In order to assess the effects of risk management standards on MRSA 
infection rates, while seeking to control for other relevant trends and policy 
measures, we use panel data on NHS acute hospital trusts from several 
previously unconnected administrative databases.  The panel covers the period 
2001-8; i.e. it starts when the NHSLA moved to exclusive use of risk 
management standards, and it encompasses the rise and decline of MRSA 
rates in the NHS.  We are able to control for various observable measures of 
hospital risk type, including mean length of stay, bed utilisation, and casemix. 
Each of these measures varies across hospitals and over time and, as we have 
seen, may also provide part of the explanation for MRSA reductions.12 There 
are other potentially relevant time-independent variables such as the 
geographical location of the hospital, and the specialist status of the hospital, 
and we also explore these.   We use time dummies in order to control for 
specific policy measures (including separate ones for the period covered by the 
                                                 
11 These include the shift towards shorter lengths of stay in acute hospitals (Lucet et al., 2005), 
and changes to the utilisation of capacity (Borg, 2003; Cunningham et al., 2006). In addition, 
other factors will clearly determine the observed variations in infection rates across hospitals: 
the type of hospital  and its specialty casemix, as well as staffing issues and location. 
12  It could be argued that an endogeneity problem exists insofar as MRSA infections may 
influence average length of stay: However, MRSA infections are a tiny proportion of all 
hospital cases – in 2007-8 the maximum number in any hospital was 24.6 per 100,000 bed-
days - and hence have an undetectable effect on hospital average length of stay. 
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Health Act and the „deep clean‟ initiative).   Crucially, in order to assess the 
effectiveness of the NHSLA‟s risk classification measures, we use information 
on the level of risk management achieved by each hospital (as assessed by the 
NHSLA) in each year of our period.  In addition, the dynamic nature of the 
panel offers the possibility of testing for exogeneity of the risk management 
standards.  This is the first time these various pieces of information have been 
brought together and we believe they provide the best opportunity yet to 
assess the effects of financial incentives on patient safety and litigation cost 
control within the NHS. 
 Our paper contributes to several academic debates.   First, the role of 
financial incentives in stimulating care has been a long-standing interest to 
economists in settings ranging from the workplace (Workers‟ 
Compensation13), the road (accident liability14) and health care15, with many 
countries running largescale compensation programmes in these areas: it is 
essential that these programmes are able to incentivise the agents they cover 
to take care and to reveal their risk class in order to ensure actuarially fair 
contribution from members.  From a more general perspective, the 
effectiveness of financial incentives goes to the heart of principal-agent 
models.  Second, we provide a relatively rare study of the empirical operation 
of risk classification (as opposed to the use of deductibles), which is of great 
importance to some largescale compensation programmes like the US workers 
compensation scheme – as well as the NHS.  Third, as stated above, we feel 
that our data provide an opportunity to examine whether the NHSLA‟s risk 
classification reflects hospital heterogeneity or incentivises patient safety 
measures and thus contributes to an important literature on the presence of 
moral hazard or adverse selection in insurance settings.   
 The paper is structured as follows.  Section II presents an overview of 
the risk management measures used by NHS hospitals with respect to their 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Moore and Viscusi (1990). 
14 See e.g. Kochanowski and Young (1985); Devlin (1992); Cummins et al. (2001). 
15 See e.g. Kessler and McClennan (1996, 2002), Danzon (2000); Fenn et al. (2004), Sloan and 
Chepke (2008). 
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exposure to hospital-acquired infections. These measures include both direct 
cleaning initiatives and the indirect financial incentives rewarding good risk 
management practices through discounts to CNST contributions. Section III 
reviews our panel dataset, and the following section outlines the estimation 
methodologies by which we analyse this dataset to test hypotheses concerning 
the determinants of the frequency of MRSA infections across hospitals and 
over time. Section V presents our results and a final section concludes. 
 
II.  NHS risk management and MRSA 
Liability risk pooling and risk management standards 
Hospitals naturally seek protection from the liabilities they may face under 
tort.  Insurance provides such protection but information asymmetries can 
leave the insurer exposed to moral hazard by removing hospitals‟ exposure to 
the costs of their actions, and to the danger of rising premiums as a result of 
adverse selection.16  We now describe the current arrangements for protecting 
against these problems in the NHS.  The main body responsible for 
administering schemes allowing NHS trusts in England to pool the costs of 
liabilities to patients arising from the carrying out of their functions is the 
NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA), a Special Health Authority established in 
November 1995.  The NHSLA is responsible for administering the Clinical 
Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST), a voluntary scheme to which all 
English NHS Trusts and PCTs currently belong, and covers clinical incidents 
occurring on or after the date when the Trust joined the scheme.  
 The current CNST scheme is a „pay as you go‟ scheme, in which 
contributions for each year are calculated so as to cover expected costs, 
including claims and administrative costs. The pay as you go approach 
minimises the cash reserves that are required to operate the scheme (by 
                                                 
16 We have noted above that membership of the CNST is not compulsory. Consequently, as 
NHS hospitals trusts gain more financial autonomy, there is a risk that commercial liability 
insurers could offer preferential terms to low risk hospitals, hence endangering the viability of 
the CNST through a form of adverse selection that would place upward pressure on 
contributions.  
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comparison with fully funded liability insurance). The basis of the scheme is 
an actuarial model that forecasts the expenditure based on the predicted 
number and value of claims arising in each period. If contributions are set at a 
level that exceeds the outturn expenditure, these are passed back to members 
in the form of rebates on contributions in future years. 
 Having estimated the aggregate contributions required to finance the 
scheme, individual contributions from each scheme member are calculated. 
Contributions are based on the number of staff employed in different risk 
categories by each Trust member. Whole time equivalent (WTE) staff are 
counted and then divided into five risk categories, reflecting the national 
experience of claims rates and values by specialty: low risk, medium risk, high 
risk, very high risk, and obstetrics & gynaecology. Weightings are attached to 
each of these, on the basis of the predicted number and value of claims in 
each category, and the weights are given a cash value that will equate the total 
contributions required from all members times the total staff employed by all 
members. It is then possible to calculate the annual contribution required 
from each member.  
 Two adjustments are then made to this estimated contribution.17 First, 
each Trust is experience rated on the basis of actual compared with expected 
claims based on risk exposure measured using the WTE staff data. The 
experience rating takes one of five values: +10%, +5%, 0%, -5% and -10%. 
Second, and most importantly for this paper, the scheme also gives a role to 
the risk management processes that members have in place when determining 
contributions. Assessments are currently routinely conducted every two years, 
but organisations failing to attain the first level of standard are assessed 
annually. The assessment is based on seven „core‟ standards, amongst which 
are specific reference to infection control measures.18 Trusts which are 
assessed as complying with the standards are entitled to a discount from their 
                                                 
17 In addition, until 2002, hospitals were permitted to choose deductibles levels below which 
they were responsible for the patient‟s claim, and which in turn affected the contribution paid. 
This facility no longer exists. 
18 This includes explicit reference to directly related practices such as measures in place to 
ensure hand hygiene amongst patients and staff (see NHSLA, 2010). 
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scheme contribution for the following two financial years. The discounts on 
CNST contributions are 10% (level 1 compliance), 20% (level 2 compliance) 
and 30% (level 3 compliance). The discount earned by members is applied to 
contributions in the financial year following a successful assessment and is 
valid for 2 years.19  
 
Other measures to control MRSA infections 
In 2001 a mandatory surveillance system was introduced in England, in order 
to provide better information on the number, characteristics and distribution 
of MRSA infections; this scheme has since been widened and strengthened, 
for example since 2005 to provide specialty information and data on whether 
infection was present at admission (Health Protection Agency, 2007). 
Following this, in 2002 a broad control strategy for all infectious diseases was 
set out, which recommended a wide set of policy initiatives including 
strengthened control measures for health care associated infections 
(Department of Health, 2002). In 2003 the Chief Medical Officer published a 
report focusing on healthcare associated infection, giving local NHS agencies 
specific directions on actions that should be taken to reduce healthcare 
associated infections.  These included better surveillance, improved techniques 
for use of catheters, tubes and instruments, higher standards of hygiene in 
clinical practice, more prudent use of antibiotics, and a range of managerial 
and organisational changes such as having designated Directors of Infection 
Prevention and Control within each local NHS organisation,  instructing 
infection control teams to work directly with bed managers, and reminding 
Chief Executives of NHS organisations of their legal duties to identify and 
control infection risk in the workplace (Department of Health, 2003b).  
 In 2004 a number of specific steps were taken to implement these 
recommendations. The “cleanyourhands” campaign was launched by the 
NPSA as a national multimodal advertising initiative in England and Wales to 
                                                 
19 A typical large teaching hospital could have a total CNST contribution of approximately 
£10m in 2009-10; the value of a level 3 discount for such trusts could therefore be in the 
region of £3m per annum. 
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improve hand hygiene amongst healthcare workers, particularly in acute 
hospitals, by means of much higher usage of alcohol handrubs and soaps. 
Also in 2004, the Department of Health began to direct additional resources 
towards NHS trusts with particularly high MRSA rates.  
 In 2006 a new Health Act was introduced, setting out a detailed 
hygiene code for NHS organisations to assess and manage infection risks, 
implement clinical care protocols, and provide training: adhering to this is a 
statutory requirement on all NHS organisations (Department of Health, 2006) 
and failure to comply could potentially result in civil or criminal proceedings 
against individual members of the hospital management.   This was followed 
in 2007 by an agreement by all strategic health authorities to spend a total of 
£57 million by the end of 2007-8 on „deep cleaning‟ all hospitals, involving 
wards being vacated and cleaned by steam cleaners using detergent and water 
at high temperatures. These and several other policy initiatives are summarised 
in „Clean, safe care: reducing infections and saving lives‟ (Department of 
Health, 2008). 
 Taken together, therefore, the period since 2000 has witnessed a large 
number of policy initiatives and managerial changes relating to healthcare 
associated infection.  It is possible that these had some effect on the incidence 
of MRSA and other health associated infections, but there is little reliable 
evidence on this.  Thus, in the process of controlling for these initiatives, our 
paper provides a rare opportunity to help assess them. 
 
III. Data 
The data used for this project were accessed from various sources made 
available by the Department of Health (DoH) and the NHSLA.20 The 
variables used were aggregated to trust level wherever necessary, and a panel 
dataset created. As the DoH and NHSLA use different administrative codes 
for identifying hospital trusts, it was necessary to match manually the records 
from the hospital trust names when merging them together. The names of the 
                                                 
20 Appendix 1 details the sources of our data. 
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trusts were not always recorded consistently across the different data sources 
and the data matching process involved the use of a search and replace 
algorithm combined with manual identification of the names in some cases. 
For consistency, we used the DoH administrative codes and updated these as 
and when data sets relevant to the analysis were added. Since all the variables 
used in this study could not be observed for all the tracked hospital trusts in 
all years, we ended up with an unbalanced panel data set over the period 2001 
to 2008. 
 
Risk management standards 
As explained above, the payment for CNST membership varies depending on 
the hospital‟s casemix, the claims experience, and the risk management 
standards applied. Hospitals with low assessed risk management standards 
face a higher CNST contribution than those with high standards.21 Moreover, 
these standards have been assessed and re-assessed by the NHSLA over time. 
Hospitals have a clear financial incentive to improve their procedures via the 
risk management discounts which are applied (the moral hazard argument) or, 
alternatively, those hospitals with good procedures in place have a clear 
incentive to demonstrate that they are entitled to the reduced contribution. 
The availability of panel data creates an opportunity to test whether or not this 
incentive led to improvements in hospital cleanliness which resulted in better 
control over hospital-borne infections.  
 Table 1 shows the variation in assessed risk management standards 
across acute NHS hospital trusts from 2001-8. It is evident that the trend over 
time has been for an overall progressive increase in the number of hospitals 
assessed as having high standards of risk management, although considerable 
variations across hospitals remain throughout the period of observation. 
 
*** Tables 1 and 2 here *** 
                                                 
21 10% discount for attaining level 1, 20% for level 2, 30% for level 3. 
    13 
 Table 2 shows the variation in MRSA infection rates across hospitals 
attaining these different risk management levels. There does seem to be a clear 
association in the pooled data such that higher risk management levels are 
associated with lower infection rates. However, there are many possibilities for 
hospital characteristics to vary across risk management levels in a way which 
would affect their infection rates, so the multivariate analysis undertaken 
below is essential before arriving at firm conclusions. 
 Moreover, a fundamental issue for the subsequent analysis of these 
data is the potential endogeneity of the risk management standard. As 
suggested above, hospitals with good prior safety records (including low 
infection rates) would be more likely to apply for and be awarded a 
contribution discount by the NHSLA at audit – that is, the standards would 
be endogenous. If by contrast the contribution discount incentivises 
investment in patient safety measures such as better infection control, then the 
attainment of higher risk management standards would be followed by 
reduced infection rates – that is, the standards would be exogenous. We 
therefore allow for both possibilities in the estimates reported below. 
 
MRSA infections, casemix and hospital activity 
Data on MRSA infections were extracted from the Health Protection Agency 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre. These cover the period from 
April 2001 (when mandatory surveillance began) to September 2009. Data 
were available for each acute NHS hospital trust by number of MRSA 
bacteraemia reports. 
 Figure 1 presents the total MRSA bacteraemia reports per year in acute 
NHS hospital trusts, and the rate per 10,000 Finished Consultant Episodes 
(FCEs). There appears to be a steady decline in total infections since 2003, 
accelerating sharply after 2006. The MRSA infection rate fell from 5.86 
reports per 10,000 FCEs in 2001 to 1.83 per 10,000 FCEs in 2008, 
representing an overall reduction of 69% over that period.  
 
*** Figure 1 here *** 
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 Figure 2 shows how the annual number of MRSA infections per 
hospital were distributed across acute NHS hospitals. Clearly, there are 
considerable differences in the number of infections across hospitals, which 
will be determined by hospital throughput and casemix, but which may, of 
course, also be a function of the infection control measures discussed above 
as well as external factors influencing the incidence rate. It should be noted 
that there are a relatively small number of hospitals for which there were zero 
infections observed in a given year.22 
 
*** Figure 2 here *** 
 
 Figure 3 shows the regional breakdown of MRSA infection rates per 
10,000 FCEs. There appears to be a higher incidence in London than in other 
regions, but this may of course be due to variations in casemix, length of stay 
and rates of bed utilisation in London hospitals.  
 
*** Figure 3 here *** 
 
 The most important factors potentially influencing inter-hospital 
variations in MRSA infections relate to the throughput, length of stay, capacity 
utilisation and casemix of the hospital – direct measures of exposure to 
infection. Clearly, raw activity level measures such as the number of 
admissions or treatment episodes at a particular hospital will be the main 
factor determining the number of infections. In addition, the nature of the 
treatment episodes will influence the frequency of infection: hospitals with a 
large proportion of surgical patients may be more open to infection than 
others, for instance. Table 3 summarises the panel of data we have in relation 
to hospital activity levels (measured by the total number of finished consultant 
                                                 
22 In fact, only one hospital reported zero infections in all eight years of observation, implying 
that all but one hospital contributed a positive observation to the panel dataset. 
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episodes and average length of stay), bed utilisation rates (i.e. occupied beds 
relative to bed capacity), and casemix variables (i.e. the proportion of bed days 
allocated to the main treatment specialities). 
 
*** Table 3 here *** 
 
 Figures 4 and 5 show the regional patterns of mean length of stay and 
bed utilisation rates respectively. The pattern of change in relation to mean 
length of stay looks to be highly correlated with changes in MRSA rates; on 
the whole, regions such as London, with high but rapidly declining MRSA 
rates, also have high but rapidly declining length of stay. By contrast, while the 
regions with the highest bed utilisation rates (London and the South East) also 
have relatively high MRSA rates, the correspondence is not so marked. 
 
*** Figures 4 and 5 here *** 
 
 Finally, we also have data on the expenditure by NHS acute hospitals 
on cleaning services, using compulsory returns to the NHS Information 
Centre since 1999 on Hospital Estates and Facilities Statistics. This 
expenditure showed a significant increase in relation to the volume of activity 
(i.e. patient bed-days). Table 4 summarises: 
 
*** Table 4 here *** 
 
IV. Estimation 
Data generation process 
The observed total number of MRSA infections in a given hospital i would 
clearly depend on a measure of patients‟ exposure to risk – that is, the number 
of treatment episodes for the hospital in a given year (Tit). Consequently, the 
expected number of infections in year t at hospital i would be Titit where it 
represents the mean probability of a patient becoming infected during a given 
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treatment episode.  
 The latent variable it can be modelled as a function of observed 
covariates and unobserved random variables. With a conventional loglinear 
specification of this function, we have 
 
2exp( )it it it itd    1β ρ       (1) 
 
where it is a vector of measures capturing the hospital‟s location, casemix and 
activity rates (length of stay, bed utilisation rate). The variable dit measures the 
risk management standard achieved by the hospital and; 1 and β2 are the 
associated coefficients. The error term it measures the impact of unobserved 
heterogeneity in the underlying risk across hospitals: given the difficulty in 
capturing through observables all variations in case complexity, management 
efficiency, and other local factors, this is likely to be a significant determinant 
of inter-hospital variation in the number of infections. 
 If the observed number of infections in hospital i in year t is 
represented by xit, then we can construct an estimating equation for (1) as: 
 
2exp( )
it
it it i it
it
x
d u v
T
   1β ρ      (2) 
 
where the LHS variable in (2) is the infection rate – the number of observed 
infections as a proportion of the number of treatment episodes.23 
Furthermore, if xit is strictly positive (as with almost all our data), equation (2) 
can be transformed for estimation as 
 
2ln( )
it
it it i it
it
x
d u v
T
   1β ρ       (3) 
                                                 
23 Note that this variable could in principle be greater than 1, as each treatment episode could 
be characterised by more than one infection – that is, it is a rate, not a probability. It is for this 
reason that we do not choose to estimate eq. (2) using a probit estimator. 
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 Our observation period in this study is the years from 2001 to 2008. 
Clearly during this period there may also have been a systematic change over 
time in the incidence of MRSA bacteraemia due to direct measures taken by 
the NHSA to control infection rates, and for this reason we include time 
dummy variables in all our regressions. In addition, however, it is possible that 
there is a degree of persistence in the reported rate of infection within a given 
hospital, due perhaps to the delays in organising appropriate responses on the 
part of hospital management. The appropriate estimating equation will 
therefore have a lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors. In the 
case of the loglinear version of the data generating process, we have: 
1
2
1
ln( ) ln( )it it it it i it
it it
x x
d u v
T T
 

    1β ρ     (4) 
where the parameter  measures the degree of persistence.  
 An important issue for estimation arises from the possibility that d is 
an endogenous regressor due to the possibility that past levels of expenditure 
on risk management activities (including infection control measures) help 
determine the standard applied for and achieved. If we can further assume 
that E[ln(it)|z] is a constant independent of an instrumental variable vector z, 
then even where d is shown to be endogenous it is possible to estimate 
consistently the parameters of the log-linear model in (4) using a dynamic 
GMM estimator which is fully robust and asymptotically efficient (Baum et al., 
2003). In estimating (4) we have an additional source of endogeneity bias 
through the presence of the lagged dependent variable („dynamic panel bias‟). 
Moreover, in this case the standard fixed-effect estimator is unable to solve 
this problem using higher lags of the dependent variable as instruments. The 
usual solution to this problem is to resort to the use of first differencing of the 
data, and then to estimate the resulting equation using GMM (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). The (differenced) lagged dependent variable remains 
endogenous, but now it is possible to use the lagged levels of the dependent 
variable as instruments. However, in circumstances where there is stochastic 
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variation in the dependent variable around a relatively stable trend, it has been 
shown that difference GMM lacks efficiency because in that case lagged levels 
convey little information about future changes (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Drawing on Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond show that an 
alternative is to estimate (4) as an untransformed equation in levels, using the 
differences in the lagged dependent variable as instruments. These differenced 
instruments are exogenous providing that they are uncorrelated with the fixed 
effects ui.
24 They can be added to the instruments in levels from the difference 
GMM estimator to form a potentially more efficient system GMM estimator 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
 In addition to providing a means of estimating the coefficient on the 
endogenous lagged dependent variable consistently, the dynamic system 
GMM estimator also allows for the possibility of endogeneity in other 
regressors through the use of lagged instruments.  A pairwise comparison of 
sets of orthogonality conditions corresponding to the assumption of 
endogeneity or exogeneity respectively can be undertaken, with the difference 
in Hansen J test statistics obtained from these comparisons being distributed 
as Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors 
being tested for endogeneity. Rejection of the null implies that the regressor 
(or subset of regressors) should be treated as endogenous.25  
 As well as ensuring an appropriate estimation strategy, controlling for 
possible endogeneity of the risk management standards may also provide 
insights into the way that the standards operate – as discussed in the 
Introduction.  In particular, by indicating whether patient safety outcomes 
„lead‟ or „lag‟ attainment of a given standard, we can comment on whether 
they address problems associated with the classification of hospital risk or 
incentives to reduce it that are faced by the NHSLA.   
 
                                                 
24 It can be shown that, under certain assumptions, this requirement is equivalent to one about 
the initial conditions of the data generating process (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
25 Baum et al. (2003, pp. 23-24) show the equivalence of this “difference in Hansen” test to the 
conventional Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test. 
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V. Results 
Table 5 shows the results for the system GMM model used to estimate the 
determinants of inter-hospital variations in MRSA rates over time. The lagged 
dependent variable is assumed to be endogenous, as are cleaning costs.26 
Moreover, because of the ambiguity over the role of risk management 
standards discussed above, we test for the joint endogeneity of these 
regressors using a difference in Hansen test as explained above (the result of 
the difference in Hansen test is reported at the foot of the Table). We use as 
instruments the observed overall claims experience of the hospital, as reported 
by the NHSLA, as well as second and higher lags of the potentially 
endogenous variables.27 All other variables are assumed to be strictly 
exogenous, and are therefore instrumented by their contemporaneous and 
lagged values. The overall validity of the instrument set is assessed by means 
of a robust Hansen J statistic which does not reject the null that the full 
instrument sets are exogenous. 
 The table shows a significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable  
with a value 0.172, indicating a degree of persistence in the infection rates, and 
confirming the need for a dynamic model. Moreover the diagnostic tests with 
respect to autocorrelation are satisfactory: as expected, the null of no first 
order serial correlation in the differenced disturbances can be rejected, but the 
null of no second order serial correlation cannot28.  
 
*** Table 5 here *** 
                                                 
26  It seems likely that cleaning campaigns would be directed at those hospitals with higher 
infection rates. 
27 The claims experience of the hospital is the only available candidate for an external 
instrument; it would seem on a priori grounds to be a factor which may be correlated with the 
choice of risk management standard, but, given the wide variety of factors in addition to 
MRSA infections that may lead to a negligence claim, it is unlikely to be correlated with the 
error term. All other instruments used are internal to the model. As explained in the text, we 
test for overall instrument validity using Hansen J tests. 
28 Clearly, serial correlation of the error terms might be present due to model mis-
specification. The test for second order autocorrelation in the first differenced error terms can 
be considered to be a test for first order autocorrelation of the undifferenced error terms; our 
results suggest that the null of no second order autocorrelation in the first differences cannot 
be rejected. 
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Risk management standards 
From Table 5, the coefficients on attainment of CNST levels 2 and 3 are both 
negative; in the case of level 3 the coefficient is statistically significant, 
showing a reduction in the infection rate for these hospitals of 23%.29  In the 
case of level 2, the effect is equivalent to a reduction of 9%, though this fails 
to reach conventional levels of significance. In order to interpret these results 
in the light of the discussion earlier in this paper, we test the risk management 
levels for endogeneity, using the difference in Hansen test described above. 
The results show that the null of exogeneity cannot be rejected. 
 These results suggest that the incentive properties of the discounts 
available for attaining higher risk management levels are non-negligible. 
Hospitals achieving level 3, in particular, appear to have been incentivised by 
the higher discount available to invest in new procedures, the outcome of 
which does seem to be improved patient safety, at least as measured by 
reductions in MRSA infection rates.  This causality suggests that the dominant 
factor operating on level 3 is the incentivisation of additional investment in 
risk management as described by  Bond and Crocker (1991).   At least some of 
the improvements in infection rates associated with the NHSLA‟s risk 
classification can therefore be said to result directly from the financial 
incentives provided within the CNST scheme. 
 
Hospital hygiene measures 
Our measure of cleaning costs per bedday was designed partly to measure the 
extent to which differences across hospitals in cleaning effort impacted on 
infection rates, but also to pick up the timing and intensity of the “deep clean” 
initiatives as they affected individual hospitals. The results of the regression 
reported in Table 5 indicate, perhaps surprisingly, that the intensity of cleaning 
                                                 
29 Note that the coefficients on binary regressors in a loglinear model need careful 
interpretation; the percentage changes reported here are derived from the coefficients in Table 
5, transformed using the method suggested by Kennedy (1981). Note also that the effects 
reported above are short term effects; because the dynamic specification is supported here, 
the long term effects will be greater. 
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was not a factor explaining differences in infection rates across hospitals over 
time. It is likely that hospital hygiene is a much broader issue than can be 
measured by cleaning effort.  
 The time dummies included in our regression specification are there to 
pick up the effect of other systematic factors changing over time which are 
not captured by changes in length of stay, casemix, risk management 
standards, cleaning effort or other observables. In each case the coefficients 
on these dummies are testing the hypothesis that infection rates had changed 
over time, after controlling for other observable factors. Although they are all 
negative from 2002, it is not until 2007 that a statistically significant effect is 
found, with the results for that year showing a highly significant reduction of 
approximately 30% in the MRSA infection rate by comparison with 2006, and 
for 2008 a further significant reduction of approximately 20% by comparison 
with 2007. This „unexplained‟ part of the fall in the infection rate could of 
course be due to underlying changes in the prevalence of MRSA in the 
community, but on grounds of timing it seems most likely to be due to the 
range of actions taken by management following the Health Act 2006 which 
made hospital hygeine a statutory requirement (see the discussion in Section II 
above). There is, however, no evidence that the earlier measures based on 
exhortations, such as the „cleanyourhands‟ campaign, had any significant effect 
on the overall MRSA infection rate. 
 
Length of stay and bed utilisation 
The estimates also show a strong sensitivity of the infection rates to the 
average length of stay in acute NHS trusts. The estimated elasticity of 0.551 is 
statistically significant, implying that acute hospitals with longer mean lengths 
of stay will have increased MRSA rates, although not fully in proportion to the 
differentials in length of stay. This suggests that the changes in average acute 
lengths of stay observed nationally (see Figure 3 and Table 4) should have had 
a significant effect on infection rates, with each percentage point reduction in 
length of stay resulting in a 0.55 percentage point reduction in infection rates. 
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This implies that of the 69% reduction in the MRSA infection rate in acute 
hospitals observed nationally between 2001 and 2008, approximately 19% was 
due to the trend towards lower duration of acute hospital stays. From Table 2, 
the fall in mean length of stay nationally from 3.585 in 2001 to 2.436 in 2008 
represents a decline of 32%, implying a 19% reduction in MRSA rates 
attributable to this factor. Indeed, much of the fall in MRSA rates before 2006 
could be explained purely in terms of the length of stay effect. 
 Our results provide no evidence of an effect of bed utilisation on 
infection rates. In particular, it seems that hospitals in certain areas of the 
country have both high bed utilisation rates and relatively high MRSA rates, 
but that when we control for location, this correlation disappears. The regions 
which do seem to have high incidence rates of MRSA infections after 
controlling for other factors are London, the South East and, particularly, the 
West Midlands. This may have something to do with the comparative 
demographics of these regions, but clearly more research is needed on this. 
 
Casemix and hospital type 
Turning finally to the results on casemix, there seems to be evidence that 
MRSA infection rates are highest when there is a high proportion of other 
surgery bed-days. MRSA infection rates also vary according to hospital type: 
single-specialty hospitals have much lower MRSA infection rates than others, 
even after controlling for casemix and length of stay. The coefficient estimate 
on the dummy variable for single specialty hospitals suggests that the infection 
rates in these hospitals is less than half that in other acute hospitals, after 
controlling for casemix and length of stay. This finding may be consistent with 
Grundmann et al.‟s (2010) recent evidence that MRSA infections are spread 
through movement of patients within the hospital system, rather than in the 
community. 
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we have used a dynamic panel data specification to explore the 
determinants of variations in the rate of reported MRSA infections across 
acute NHS hospitals over the period 2001-2008, with particular emphasis on 
the impact of financial incentives to improve risk management.  This issue is 
central to debates about the costs of compensation claims against the NHS 
and how this impacts on the (increasingly) scarce resources available for health 
care.  This was a period during which the NHSLA had abandoned the 
conventional use of deductibles as a means of incentivising hospital 
management to improve patient safety measures. The alternative approach 
implemented a process of continuous audit of risk management procedures in 
order to reward „good‟ hospitals with lower contributions to the compensation 
scheme. This approach depends on hospital management being incentivised 
by the lower contributions to invest in better procedures designed to improve 
patient safety through the adoption of improved risk managements standards.  
 Clearly the success of this strategy relies on a comparison of the 
benefits from reduced contributions against the compliance costs required. 
Our findings indicate that the higher discount levels associated with 
attainment of level 3 were sufficient to justify empirically detectable 
improvements in infection control by some hospitals, but the lower discounts 
available for level 2 compliance were less effective in terms of improvements 
in care.  This association between risk management standards and patient 
safety could of course be a simple outcome of risk-related contributions. 
However, we have found no evidence to dispute the exogeneity of these 
standards, which is consistent with the existence of a causal relationship 
between an improvement in standards and a subsequent improvement in 
patient safety. This finding therefore supports the view expressed by Bond 
and Crocker (1991) that risk classification by insurers based on observable 
investments can be used as a means of minimising moral hazard.  Although 
not tested here, a strong inference could be made that hospitals with 
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measurable improvements in patient safety will be those with reduced 
liabilities in terms of patient compensation. 
 In addition to the effect of risk management standards, we have also 
tested for the relationship between mean length of stay, bed utilisation, and 
casemix measures on MRSA infection rates. Our findings are consistent with a 
fall in the rate of MRSA infections, due in part to the trend reduction in 
average length of stay in NHS acute hospitals (indeed our results suggest that 
the major part of the overall reduction prior to 2007 was due to the fall in 
average length of stay). It could be argued that our finding of a significant 
elasticity of MRSA rates with respect to average length of stay is evidence that 
MRSA is typically acquired within the hospital, rather than acquired in the 
community and discovered in the hospital.30  
 There remains a significant unexplained part of the variation in 
infection rates over time which may be attributable to government action in 
relation to patient safety measures. On grounds of timing in relation to this 
residual pattern, it is possible to argue that the Health Act of 2006, which 
made hospital hygeine a statutory requirement, was highly effective. It is less 
convincing to argue from our evidence that the various directions made by the 
Chief Medical Officer in 2003 and implemented from 2004 onwards were a 
factor leading to lower infection rates. 
 Our results may have useful implications for policy makers and the 
wider literature.  At a time when patient safety and subsequent claims for 
compensation are high on the policy agenda, the results indicate that financial 
incentives linked to risk classification can play an important role in this area.  
In particular, they suggest that risk management standards can be an effective 
part of the NHSLA‟s arsenal.  This may be equally relevant to other largescale 
compensation settings where it is difficult for the insurer to identify and 
manage incentives at a more micro level, such as US-style Workers‟ 
Compensation schemes.   
                                                 
30 See Grundmann et al. (2010). 
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 As always, the interpretation (and the detail) of findings need to be 
revisited as new data become available.  We feel that the dynamic panel we 
have assembled can play a useful role here and we plan to update and revisit it 
over time.  It would also be interesting to explore the possible reasons for the 
stronger results we have found for level 3 risk management standards: perhaps 
they require more „intense‟ efforts in some sense than their lower 
counterparts.31  In the meantime, the effective means of control of patient 
safety and health care resources will continue to be an important topic for the 
NHS – and for other health care systems around the world. 
 
                                                 
31 One possibility would be to construct a continuous measure of hospitals‟ costs of achieving 
each standard in order to capture effort intensity.  We are not aware that such data are 
currently available. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1. MRSA bacteraemia reports from 2001 to 2008 
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Figure 2. Distributions of annual MRSA infection numbers, NHS acute 
hospital trusts 2001-2008 
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Figure 3. MRSA infection rates by SHA region from 2001 to 2008 
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Figure 4. Mean length of stay by SHA region from 2001 to 2008:  
acute NHS hospital trusts 
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Figure 5. Mean bed utilisation rates by SHA region from 2001 to 2008: 
acute NHS hospital trusts 
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TABLE 1 
 
CNST risk management standards, NHS acute hospital trusts, 2001-2008 
 
CNST level 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
         
0 
 
20 21 7 0 0 0 2 1 
1 
 
117 111 115 110 88 88 80 76 
2 
 
26 29 39 46 68 70 75 76 
3 
 
1 3 5 10 10 10 12 10 
Total 164 164 166 166 166 168 169 166 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Mean MRSA infection rates by CNST risk management standard, NHS acute hospital 
trusts, 2001-2008 
 
 
CNST level Mean Std. Dev N 
0 6.24 3.55 64 
1 4.86 2.96 779 
2 3.89 2.84 356 
3 2.49 1.43 50 
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 TABLE 3 
 
Mean FCEs, bed utilisation rates, length of stay and casemix variables, NHS acute 
hospital trusts 2001-2008 
 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Finished consultant episodes 65098 70261 74359 76596 80573 83632 87519 92909 
Mean length of stay (days) 3.585 3.491 3.453 3.263 2.995 2.790 2.524 2.436 
Bed utilisation rate 0.837 0.844 0.847 0.843 0.840 0.836 0.839 0.848 
Proportion general medicine 0.219 0.238 0.252 0.248 0.247 0.235 0.222 0.222 
Proportion general surgery 0.097 0.103 0.105 0.104 0.104 0.102 0.101 0.099 
Proportion gynaecology 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.033 
Proportion obstetrics 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.035 
Proportion paediatrics 0.068 0.070 0.071 0.068 0.074 0.074 0.080 0.079 
Proportion trauma/orthopaedics 0.106 0.114 0.116 0.115 0.113 0.114 0.113 0.110 
Proportion urology 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 
Proportion other surgery32 0.062 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.064 0.065 0.067 0.069 
Proportion other medicine 0.257 0.282 0.280 0.290 0.289 0.304 0.325 0.332 
Sources: see Appendix 1.
                                                 
32 “Other surgery” includes Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT), Ophthalmology, Oral surgery, 
Restorative dentistry, pediatric dentistry, Orthodontics, Oral and maxillo facial surgery, 
Endodontics, Periodontics, Prosthodontics, Surgical dentistry, Neurosurgery, Plastic surgery, 
Cardiothoracic surgery and Paediatric surgery.  Many of these are small numbers and not 
completely consistent over time, hence were grouped under one heading. 
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TABLE 4 
 
Mean cleaning costs per bed-day, NHS acute hospital trusts 2001-2008 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mean cleaning cost 
(£) 
1755761 1938495 2053049 2278236 2615390 2797186 3080852 3472303 
Mean bed-days 220905 233131 236330 232298 224441 219189 214776 220239 
Mean cleaning cost 
per bed-day (£) 
8.35 8.83 9.29 10.59 12.58 14.25 18.02 20.33 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
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TABLE 5 
 
Estimation (system GMM) 
 
 Ln(MRSA infection rate)[t] 
Ln(MRSA infection rate)[t-1] 0.172** 
 (2.80) 
Ln(length of stay) 0.551*** 
 (3.86) 
Ln(bed utilization rate) -0.397 
 (-1.28) 
Ln(cleaning cost per bedday) 0.107 
 (0.75) 
CNST level 2 -0.0964 
 (-1.45) 
CNST level 3 -0.258* 
 (-2.10) 
Proportion general surgery 0.00389 
 (0.00) 
Proportion gynaecology -0.108 
 (-0.13) 
Proportion obstetrics -0.727 
 (-1.34) 
Proportion paediatrics -0.876 
 (-1.77) 
Proportion trauma & orthopaedics -0.129 
 (-0.42) 
Proportion urology 0.479 
 (0.21) 
Proportion other surgery 1.162** 
 (3.02) 
Proportion other medicine 0.307 
 (1.53) 
Year=2003 0.00944 
 (0.24) 
Year=2004 -0.0480 
 (-1.12) 
Year=2005 -0.0417 
 (-0.66) 
Year=2006 -0.112 
 (-1.44) 
Year=2007 -0.500*** 
 (-5.27) 
Year=2008 -0.877*** 
 (-7.97) 
Single specialty hospital -0.927*** 
 (-4.37) 
Teaching hospital 0.0426 
 (0.69) 
East of England -0.0708 
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 (-0.67) 
London 0.176 
 (1.84) 
North East -0.0776 
 (-0.74) 
North West 0.0182 
 (0.21) 
South Central -0.0484 
 (-0.47) 
South East 0.124 
 (1.20) 
South West 0.00991 
 (0.09) 
West Midlands 0.198* 
 (2.29) 
Yorks & Humberside -0.204 
 (-1.68) 
 
N 
 
1058 
N of hospitals 168 
χ2 1126.32 
AR(1) test statistic -5.56 
p>AR(1) 0.000 
AR(2) test statistic 1.36 
p>AR(2)  0.173 
No. of instruments 113 
Hansen J statistic 107.92 
p>J 0.617 
Diff. in Hansen 
[Null: CNST levels 2 & 3 jointly exogenous] 
 
χ2 (2) 2.18 
p> χ2 0.337 
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Appendix 1: Data sources 
 
 
Variable Source Web link 
MRSA infections MRSA Surveillance 
System, Department of 
Health 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/P
ublications/PublicationsStatistics/DH_4085951 
FCEs; Length of stay 
 
 
Hospital Episode 
Statistics, Department of 
Health 
 
 
http://www.hesonline.nhs.uk/Ease/servlet/ContentS
erver?siteID=1937&categoryID=245 
 
Bed utilisation rate 
 
Performance Statistics, 
Department of Health 
http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/hospitalactivity
/data_requests/beds_open_overnight.htm  
 
Casemix variables Hospital Episode 
Statistics by speciality, 
Department of Health 
Specific request from Department of Health 
   
Hospital cleaning 
services expenditure 
NHS Information 
Centre, Hospital Estates 
and Facilities Statistics 
 
http://www.hefs.ic.nhs.uk/DataFiles.asp  
CNST risk management 
standards  
 
 
NHSLA factsheets, 
NHSLA 
 
 
http://www.nhsla.co.uk/Publications/ 
 
Total claims paid NHSLA claims database Specific request to NHSLA 
 
 
 
